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Abstract 
Efficient resource allocation in dynamic large-scale environments is one of the cha l-
lenges of Grids. In centralized economic-based allocation approaches, the user re-
quests can be matched to the fastest, cheapest or most available resource. This ap-
proach, however, shows limitations in scalability and in dynamic environments. In 
this paper, we explore a decentralized economic approach for resource allocation in 
Grid markets based on the Catallaxy paradigm. Catallactic agents discover selling 
nodes in the resource and service Grid markets, and negotiate with each other maxi-
mizing their utility by following a strategy. By means of simulations, we evaluate the 
behavior of the approach, its resource allocation efficiency and its performance with 
different demand loads in a number of Grid density and dynamic environments. Our 
results indicate that while the decentralized economic approach based on Catallaxy 
applied to Grid markets shows similar efficiency to a centralized system, its decen-
tralized operation provides greater advantages: scalability to demand and offer, and 
robustness in dynamic environments.  
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1. Introduction  
Grids deal with the pooling and coordinated use of large sets of distributed and het-
erogeneous resources [1]. These resources can be computing power, storage of data or 
content, network bandwidth or sensor and actuators. A number of successful applica-
tions like Cactus [2] for distributed scientific problem-solving aggregate computa-
tional and data resources, or DataGrid [3] for analysis of distributed large-scale data-
bases have demonstrated the feasibility of this approach. 
Future Grid applications will have a very large and more complex resource pool com-
bined with dynamic environments [4]. Efficient resource allocation in such future 
Grid applications requires more intelligent decisions than we have in today’s systems; 
in particular, where the service is provided from and which computing resources 
should be used. It is known that delivery of computing or services based on planned 
resources, often based on worst-case scenarios, lead to poor resource utilization. Thus 
the need is for mechanisms which outsource resources in a dynamic manner,  and 
therefore have the potential to achieve efficient on-the-fly provisioning of resources.  
In this paper, we explore the use of the economic paradigm of the Catallaxy [5] as an 
approach of decentralized service provision targeting at scenarios of large and dy-
namic Grid environments. In Catallactic coordination, the decisions of the partic ipants 
of the Grid are based on economic principles, where each participant’s goal is to 
maximize his or her individual profit. Intelligent agents negotiate dynamically to pro-
vide service to the members of a virtual community. Awareness that resources like 
bandwidth, processing power and storage are limited is inherent to such a market ba-
sed coordination approach.  
The potential of the economic concept lies in the self- regulation of demand and sup-
ply, which is an emergent feature of market-based coordination mechanisms. The de-
centralized concept also achieves scalability of the resource allocation mechanism. 
Applying such a decentralized economic coordination is expected to lead to a system 
which is robust to dynamic distributed environments. 
In this work our goal is to evaluate the performance of the Catallactic paradigm for 
coordinating the service provision in large-scale dynamic Grid markets. For this pur-
pose, we have built a simulatorthat simulates the characteristics of diverse Grid sce-
narios and the underlying TCP/IP based computer networks. In simulation experi-
ments, we evaluate the performance of the proposed Catallactic coordination of Grid 
markets, characterized in terms of node density and node dynamics, and compare its 
performance with that of a centralized baseline approach. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the motivation for  the decen-
tralized and economic approach. In section 3 we describe the characteristics of the 
Catallactic approach and its potential for resource allocation. In section 4 we describe 
our simulation framework. Section 5 provides the performance evaluation of Catallac-
tic coordinated networks and the comparison with a centralized approach. Finally, 
section 6 presents the conclusions of this work and future outlook.   
2. Decentralized and Economic-based Allocation approaches 
Grids are concerned with the pooling and coordinated use of large sets of distributed 
and heterogeneous resources. These resources can consist of computing power, stor-
age of data or content, network bandwidth and sensor or actuators. Grid applications 
enable users to be provided with services such as information search, content down-
load, parallel processing, or data storage, by connecting a large number of distributed 
resources. In order to keep such a service operational and efficient, resource allocation 
mechanisms are required. Most of the current research relies on the existence of a cen-
tralized resource allocator. LEGION [6], Condor-G [7], and most Globus-based im-
plementations [8] typically use a centralized matchmaker instance to evaluate the re-
source candidate list. The matchmaker instance selects the apparently optimal match 
from the list, according to global optimization considerations on computer load, net-
work latency and usage, or storage space usage. The requesting client receives one 
singular matching partner. Clients and service providers update the centralized re-
source broker in a continuous frequency about their requests and effective availability. 
Performing resource allocation with a centralized coordinator, however, entails sev-
eral difficulties. One of the requirements for the central coordination instance to de-
cide correctly is that the environment should not change between the beginning and 
end of the control and assignment process. However the Internet is a very dynamic 
and fast changing system, and service demands and node connectivity changes are 
very frequent. A continuously updating mechanism would be needed to reflect the 
changes in the environment. A second difficulty of a centralized coordinator is that it 
requires global knowledge about the state of the system. However, as the scale of the 
systems grows the central coordinator becomes a bottleneck and a single point of fail-
ure. 
Decentralized approaches are attractive for large dynamic systems, since with a high 
number of participants the time to centrally compute a solution increases. This is due 
to the fact that the solution space formed by the number of possible combinations 
grows. In decentralized approaches, problems are solved locally without having glo-
bal information available. Decisions are independent from the instantaneous behavior 
of many other participants, since they are outside  the scope of the individual partici-
pant.  Peer-to-peer (P2P) applications connect a high number of end user application 
programs from frequently disconnected end user computers to achieve certain func-
tionality without any global state or global coordinator, therefore resource allocation 
has to be decentralized. Some examples: Gnutella [9] and Freenet [10] provide file 
and content download, aggregating end-user storage capacity; SETI@home [11] or 
Entropia [12] facilitate highly parallel computational intensive applications, aggregat-
ing end-user CPUs power. However, P2P systems provide only one kind of applica-
tion, which aggregate only one kind of resource at a time. In contrast, our target is 
Grid systems that aggregate large sets of distributed and heterogeneous resources. 
Economic models are known to be mechanisms for regulating demand and supply. 
They give incentives to providers to share resources and encourage their consumers to 
use resources efficiently. In economic models, participants or agents own their re-
sources, which they buy and sell from each other. Agents requiring resources are will-
ing to pay for them. Communication between the agents is the means by which proc-
ess are negotiated. Successful negotiations between the agents lead to the provision of 
services. Applying Economic concepts to allocating or scheduling resources in com-
puting systems is not a new idea [13][14]. An early attempt at using economic ideas is 
Agoric Open Systems (AOS) [15]. AOS were defined as software systems that use 
market mechanisms for resource allocation; they encapsulate information, access 
paths and resources in objects traded by economic actor processes. Similar projects 
are Mariposa [16], Popcorn [17], and Spawn [18]. The basic problem can be charac-
terized by having a number of processors, supplying computing power to a demand 
situation composed of computation jobs. The particular question is how supply and 
demand can be matched to each other if the situation on both sides is unclear. In 
closed environments, e.g. parallel computing, this question can usually be simplified, 
as the number of processors is fixed and the arrival of computational jobs is determi-
nistic. Most of these approaches rely on using a centralized auctioneer and the explicit 
calculation of an equilibrium price as a valid implementation of the mechanism. In 
models with centralized components, collecting and assigning bids can create a bot-
tleneck when operating in a large-scale system. Another point is that centralized com-
ponents can represent a single point of failure.  
Recent research in Grid computing has also recognized the value of price generation 
and negotiation for resource allocation and job scheduling, and in general the use of 
economic models for trading resources and services in increasingly large-scale and 
complex Grid environments. Nimrod/G Resource Broker [19], G-COMMERCE [20] 
DataGrid Optorsim study [21] are examples given for those grid economies. However 
these systems implement centralized approaches such as auctioneers or comparable 
electronic marketplace instances [22][23], which collect bids and offers from the Grid 
nodes, and match supply and demand in the same way as a stock market mechanism 
does. For example, G-COMMERCE [20] comprises agents (producers and consum-
ers), the commodity objects (tagged with a price), and a centralized institution called 
"The First Bank of G". This institution combines a "tâtonnement" [24] sequential auc-
tioneering approach with a polynomial method for finding general market equilibria. 
The price-setting of the individual producers and consumers uses local knowledge 
about the resources, and the single-variable utility functions are expressed in budget 
units only. 
Research is being carried out to improve P2P systems by applying economic con-
cepts: The computer power market [25] proposes a market-based resource manage-
ment system for P2P computing. However they their resource traders are based on 
centralized grid economic based brokers which cannot scale. The PeerMart [26] ap-
proach implements double auctions (based on well-known economic mechanisms 
[27][28]) to match client request with file hosting nodes. Such double auctions occur 
on top of a P2P overlay network to distribute broker load of an otherwise centralized 
auctioneer onto clusters of peers, each being responsible for brokering a certain num-
ber of goods. Evaluation of such mechanisms is on-going work. 
3. The Catallactic approach applied to Grid markets 
3.1 Motivation for using the Catallaxy paradigm  
Catallaxy is an alternative word for “free economy” Hayek’s notion of the Catallaxy 
[29]. The proven ability of a free-market economy to adjudicate and satis fy the con-
flicting needs of millions of human agents recommends it as a decentralized resource 
allocation principle. The Catallaxy concept is based on the explicit assumption of self-
interested actions of the participants, who try to maximize their own utility and choo-
se their actions under incomplete information and bounded rationality. The term 
Catallaxy comes from the Greek word "katallatein”, which means, "to barter” and at 
the same time, "to join a community.” The goal of Catallaxy is to arrive at a state of 
coordinated actions, the "spontaneous order”, which comes into existence through the 
bartering and communicating of the Community members with each other, thus 
achieving a community goal that no single user has planned for [29]. Catallaxy is op-
posed to “plan economy” where a central entity has global knowledge of the system 
and commands all entity decisions. In Catallaxy no entity can have global knowledge. 
In fact a central presumption is "constitutional ignorance”, assuming that it is impos-
sible (and incurable) to know everything. In Catallaxy competition is the norm: enti-
ties are selfish and work in their own interest to gain income. In Catallaxy coordina-
tion among entities occurs as a result of price signals sent among entities when nego-
tiating for goods. Another interesting property of Catallaxy is that it also coordinates 
interrelated markets. In real world market economies end-users or clients request a 
service or manufactured product from an intermediary agent such as a wholesaler or 
service provider. The wholesaler or service provider purchases or manufactures the 
desired product with resources or goods from the manufacturer. The price for the cli-
ent charged by the service provider includes the benefit added by the service provider 
for elaborating the product. Also, clients do not normally have direct access to the 
manufacturer, but purchase from service providers. 
Some of the requirements for Catallaxy to appear in a system are [30]: that agents 
work in their own interest to gain income; that they subjectively weigh and choose 
preferred alternatives, and that they have access to at least one markets. A central pre-
sumption is "constitutional ignorance”, assuming that it is impossible (and incurable) 
to know each and every circumstance that determines the agent's action. Participants 
communicate using commonly accessible markets, where they barter about access to 
resources held by other participants. Whether they are increasing or decreasing, the 
development of prices for specific goods  leads buyers to look for alternative sources 
of procurement and thus enhance the dynamics of the market. Note that a market here 
is nothing more than a communication bus – it is not a central entity of its own, which 
collects all information and matches market participants using some optimization me-
chanisms, which would contradict "constitutional ignorance”.  If there are different 
system agents which can constitute different markets then Catallaxy can hide one 
market from others while achieving coordination.  
Catallaxy can be applied to digital economies [5]. So far Catallaxy has been applied to 
digital economies where goods being sold and bought in a digital market are real life 
objects: wood, boards, panels and tables. In this work we show that Catallaxy can be 
applied to Grid markets where computational resource and services are bought and 
sold. 
Catallaxy can be implemented with multi-agents systems software technology [5]. 
Software agents can act selfishly as their human owners do, maintaining their private 
strategy and taking autonomous decisions, they can communicate directly, bypassing 
centralized control institutions and they can access markets by implementing some 
location or discovery mechanisms. 
 3.2 Catallactic Agents and Mechanisms  
Catallactic agents follow the economic goal of profit maximization. They try to buy 
input goods for less and to sell output goods for more. Depending on the current mar-
ket situation, its equity, and stock, the agent decides autonomously which action to 
take next – whether to buy, sell, produce, move or self- terminate.  
The agent lifecycle “follows the money”: if the agent has finished goods in stock, it 
tries to sell. If the agent has no goods, but input factors in stock, it simulates the pro-
duction of output goods (by waiting an appropriate length of time). If the agent has no 
input factors in stock, it tries to buy some. If the market situation is completely satis-
fying , e.g. if there are no offers or demands within a certain time span, the agent tries 
to move to another marketplace. If the agent has spent its entire budget or all market-
places are shut down, it has to terminate – every few milliseconds the agent has to pay 
utilization fees to the market anyway, so doing nothing is never a rewarding strategy.  
In the case of buying or selling, the software agent goes through the three stages of a 
market transaction: information, agreement, and settlement [31]. In the information 
phase of any transaction, a buyer or seller has to identify his or her potential trading 
partners. The buyer agent initiates the agreement phase by communicating with a sup-
plier. Both software agents negotiate using a monotonic concession protocol [32], 
where propose and counter-propose messages with subsequent price concessions are 
exchanged. If the negotiation process is successful, both agents will reach a compro-
mise price agreement ; otherwise, someone will sooner or later drop out of the negotia-
tion. In this event, the agents will restart with other partners. In the final settlement 
phase, the transaction is carried out and monitored. Sellers and buyers exchange 
goods and money, respectively. 
To maximize the spread between input and output prices, and thus its utility, the agent 
follows a certain negotiation strategy. Comparable automated negotiation efforts in 
multi-agent systems can be found in the research context of agent-mediated electronic 
commerce [33; 34] and market-oriented programming [35]. Human negotiation uses 
parameters such as demand level, concession, and concession rate [36]. A bargainer’s 
demand level can be thought of as the level of benefit to the self associated with the 
current offer or demand. A concession is a change of offer in the supposed direction 
of the other party’s interests that reduces the level of benefit sought. Concession rate 
is the speed at which demand level declines over time. In the real world, the values 
are influenced by determinants such as expectations about the other’s ultimate de-
mand, position and image loss, limit and level of aspiration and time pressure. Elec-
tronic agents use an adaptive strategy based on a stochastic finite state automa ton, in 
which action paths are taken depending on stochastic probes against certain internal 
parameters. A combination of six variables, collectively called the Genotype, with 
values from a continuous value range between 0 and 1, describes the strategy.  As an 
example, the acquisitiveness (p_acq) defines the probability of maintaining the 
agent’s own position. Whether an agent concedes in an actual negotiation step, is sub-
ject to a stochastic probe against this parameter – the lower the acquisitiveness value, 
the higher the average concession rate. If the agent concedes, the In-negotiation delta 
price change (del_change) parameter calculates the amount of the price concession 
between two negotiation steps. Both partners calculate a percentage from the price 
difference of their original offers. If the buyer has del_change = 50% and the supplier 
del_change = 0%, the agents will reach agreement after two negotiation steps at the 
initial price of the supplier, if no agent drops out.  To maximize their income, the 
agents will try to raise their initial demand level between different negotiations by the 
value of Pre-negotiation delta price change (del_jump).  The Satisfaction parameter 
(p_sat) determines if an agent will drop out from an on-going negotiation. The more 
steps the negotiation takes, or the more excessive the partner’s offers are, the sooner 
the negotiation will be discontinued. Effectively, this parameter creates time pressure.  
Information from past performance in earlier successful and unsuccessful negotiations 
computes into a subjective market price for each agent, which modifies the parameter 
Memory using a weighted exponential average with weight w_memory (w_mem).   
 
3.3 Description of Grid markets 
If nodes participating in a Grid are utility maximizing entities then a Grid economy 
appears. The Grid economy we consider in this study consists of three types of enti-
ties: resource providers, service providers, and clients. The resource providers sell re-
sources, which can be bandwidth, storage, CPU cycles. Today, Grids are assumed to 
consist of a number of resource providers, whose clients are resource consumers, in 
the sense that clients make use of raw computational, ne twork or storage resource to 
execute their private application code with their private data. After the OGSA Open 
Grid Service Architecture was proposed [37], service providers are presented as new 
actors in Grids. Service provider aggregate raw computational, network and storage 
resources from resource providers, and compose a service with a generic functionality 
demanded by several clients. The specified resource requirement depends on the 
given services. There could be simple services like a PDF conversion service [38], a 
data mining service or a whether- forecasting service, and services with a complex 
specification including several dependent tasks. Some services will be very special-
ized using proprietary algorithms, and thus will be provided only by a single service 
provider. But many other services will be provided by several service providers. The 
client requests a service from the service provider and is willing to pay for it, since the 
service represents a value for the client. 
In such a service provision scenario, two electronic markets are operated: one market 
is for resources and the other market is for services, Figure 1. Each market has buyers 
and sellers. At the service market, service providers sell and clients buy service in-
stances. At the resource market, resource providers sell, and service provider buy re-
sources. In economic terms, the separation of the market for resources and services 
means that the end-user knows neither the market for resources nor the prices for the 
resources being purchased and combined to deliver a service. The resources, on the 
other hand, do not know the prices of the service sold to the end-user. The service 
provider, however, negotiates in both markets: It negotiates with the resource provid-
ers and with the end-users to sell a service. 
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Fig. 1. Grid service and resource markets. Service clients (C) buy services at the ser-
vice market from service providers (SC), different service providers can sell the same 
service type. Service providers (SC) need raw computational, network and storage 
resources to provide its service. Service providers (SC) buy resources at the resource 
market from resource providers (R).  
 
3.4 Catallactic Agents and Mechanisms applied to Grid markets 
A Grid market can contain one of the following three types of catallactic agents:  
1) Client (C): An agent behaving as a client, or consumer, of a service. As such it 
needs to access the service, use it for a defined time period, and then continue with its 
own program sequence. The functionality required by the clients is a generic service. 
Clients request services, which can be the PDF conversion service, frequency analysis 
service, data-mining services, etc. Client agents incorporate a Catallactic agent with 
an internal strategy. Such an agent must be capable of discovering service provider 
agents and negotiate with them. 
2) Service-copy (SC): An agent behaving as a service copy offers a service as an in-
termediary. Service-copies offer the service to requesting clients. Service-copies 
agents represent an autonomous instance of a service provider, but several different 
service-copies can provide the same service, therefore there is a market where clients 
can negotiate. Several service-copies provide the same service. However they act 
autonomously when negotiating with clients. Service copies do not own the resources 
which are needed to provide the service. Service-copies must be allocated a resource 
to be able to provide the service. Service-copies buy resources at the resource market, 
where they act autonomously when negotiating and purchasing resources in the re-
source market. Each service-copy agent has an internal strategy. Since service-copy 
agents negotiate in both markets, its strategy must aim at maximizing profit in both 
markets simultaneously. 
3) Resource (R): An agent, the owner of a resource. This resource, for instance, can be 
storage or processing power. Resource agents act as the owners of resources, which 
can be bandwidth, storage or CPU cycles. 
The self- interest of the clients is to access a service at the lowest cost and/or the fast-
est time. In an environment where services have to be paid for access, the utility gain 
of clients is the difference between their private value (of what the access is worth) 
and the actually paid transaction price. Service-copies strategy must attempt to pro-
vide access to clients, such that a minimum number of service demands have to be 
rejected. A valid assumption is that service providers can charge for the access to a 
service. In this case, the service provider receives a charge price from the client. Ser-
vice-copies are interested in increasing revenue by either increasing turnover (more 
service accesses in the same time) or profit (more profit by each service access).  
Lastly, resources incur costs, and the resource agents aim to fill these costs and to 
make profits by increasing the usage of the resources. As more resources are used, 
resource agents could obtain more physical resources or they can increase the price 
paid by the service provider. 
Client agents require a discovery mechanism to locate service copies, also service-
copies require a discovery mechanism to locate resources. There exist different ser-
vice and resource discovery mechanisms in real systems with different properties: in 
Grids there exist distributed index services such as Globus MDS [39], in peer-to-peer 
networks there exist more decentralized mechanisms such as Gnutella’s flooding [9] 
or distributed hash tables [40]. Any discovery mechanism could work in some situa-
tions. However for Catallaxy, as a totally decentralized approach, discovery mecha-
nisms that are decentralized are preferred.  
The negotiation and money flow in the catallactic coordinated Grid market is shown 
in Figure 2. A client who has discovered a service-copy that can provide the service of 
its interest, initiates a negotiation with such service-copy. If the service-copy does not 
have any resource allocated, the service-copy has to locate an appropriate resource 
agent and initiate negotiations with the resources to obtain the provision of resources. 
After successful negotiations, the service-copy offers the service to the client. If the 
client accepts, then the service-copy provides the service by means of the contracted 
resources. 
 
Figure 2. Catallactic agents direct negotiation mechanisms in Grid markets. A catal-
lactic client agent negotiates for service access with a catallactic service agent, which 
in turn has to negotiate for resource provision with catallactic resource agent. After 
successful negotiations, the service-copy offers the service to the client. 
 
4 Experimental framework 
We wish to evaluate how well the Catallactic coordinated Grid markets achieve ser-
vice provision to the requesting clients. We use simulations because we are interested 
in evaluating the behaviour in different  Grid scenarios. The main goal is to measure 
the allocation efficiency of the Grid coordinated by the Catallaxy paradigm. A second 
goal is to compare the obtained results with that of a centrally coordinated baseline 
system. 
4.1 A Simulator for Grid, agents and interaction mechanisms  
The simulator must meet three main requirements: first, it must simulate grid re-
sources and service allocation mechanisms as well as client requests, but it does not 
need to simulate client access to services. Second, it is necessary to simulate autono-
mous entities with individual strategies and capable of taking autonomous decisions 
and interacting among them; therefore the simulator must be able to support multiple 
concurrent agents and inter-agents message passing mechanism. Finally, since we are 
interested in observing the behaviour of the negotiations in a Grid environment, the 
simulator must simulate an Internet network topology and its communications charac-
teristics. 
We have built a simulator that models grids on top of the J-Sim simulator [41]. The J-
Sim simulator is build based on the Autonomous Component Architecture (ACA), 
which enables simulation of multiple concurrent autonomous entities that can com-
municate with each other directly, therefore providing for the second requirement. 
Grid resource allocation mechanisms are also easily implemented in such architecture. 
Furthermore, it provides a module for simulating Internet communications links and 
topologies. Our simulator allow different types of agents to be created, which form 
Grid markets and implement application layer protocols. On a lower network level, J-
Sim simulates a general TCP/IP network. Thus, our simulator experimental studies of 
different resource allocation mechanisms at the application level can be conducted 
while realistic values of variables that depend on network characteristics can also be 
measured. 
4.2   Configuration of Grid markets and catallactic agents and mechanisms  
A physical network topology was configured in the simulator with characteristics si-
milar to the Internet: a number of core nodes highly connected in a mesh topology by 
high capacity long latency links (these connections represent international links, each 
country is usually connected to several countries forming a mesh),  each core nodes is 
connected to a   hierarchy of edge nodes by links with less capacity and less latency 
(in each country one or several operators run a network with a hierarchical topology 
of national and local links).  
Agents are instantiated on each node of the network. Agents are one of the three types 
described previously (Client, ServiceCopy, or Resource). Depending on the particular 
experiment, a node may contain several agents or none at all. In the latter case, the 
node acts simply as a network router. The number and location of resource and ser-
vice-copy agents varies according to the density setting of the experiment, which will 
be explained later.  
Resource agents represent a individual machine or a cluster of machines providing 
computational and network resources. A resource unit is equivalent to a computa-
tional capacity of 1 Gflops and a network capacity of 1 Mbits. Resource agents simu-
late resources nodes with a capacity ranging from 60 resource units (i.e. A high capac-
ity computational center with 60 Gflops computational power and 60 Mbits Inet 
conectivity) to 4 resource units (i.e. a low capacity server with 4 Gflops computational 
power and 4 Mbits Inet connectivy). Resource agents simulating high capacity com-
putational centers are situated at highly connected core nodes in the physical topology 
similar to real computational centers. Small capacity resource agents are placed at 
edge nodes. All resource agents sell equal types of resources. Resource agents were 
configured to sell each resource unit at a minimum price of 20 monetary units and at a 
maximum price of 40 monetary units.  Values of the internal strategy parameters of 
each resource agents are as follows: concession probability, p_acq, is set to 0.75; in-
negotiation delta price change, del_change, is set to 0.5; pre-negotiation delta price 
change, del_jump, is set to 0.15; continuation probability, p_sat, is set to 0.75; and 
weight of previous offers, w_mem, is set to 0.3. This values are taken from a previous 
study of the Catallaxy [44] were those values were found to be good in a different 
electronic market scenario. There may be other values that give better results in Grid 
markets, and we plan to conduct further research to show the effect of varying internal 
agents strategy values. 
Service-copy agents represent an instance of a service. Three different services, with 
different service ID, are provided by different service-copies. Several service copies 
provide the same service, with the same service ID. Service copy agents do not simu-
late service functionality, they only negotiate with resource agents to obtain those re-
sources required to provide a service, and negotiate with clients to provide their ser-
vice. In the simulator, each service copy requires a resource unit to provide service to 
each client request, a computational capacity of 1 Gflops and a network capacity of 1 
Mbits. There are many real services that require such resource levels, e.g. a media 
transcoding service requires high ne twork capacity to upload a video to be transcoded, 
and transcoding applications are computationally intensive, or a data-mining service 
requires high network capacity to upload databases to be data-mined, and data-mining 
applications are computationally intensive. Initially a service copy is installed at each 
node in the topology where resources are available. We do not consider that service-
copies could migrate or replicate towards resources where they are not previously in-
stalled. Service-copy agents are configured to try to obtain a profit for each service 
unit sold of: a minimum of 20 monetary units and a maximum of 30 monetary units.  
Values of the internal strategy parameters of each service-copy agents are similar to 
resource agents: concession probability, p_acq, is set to 0.75; in-negotiation delta 
price change, del_change, is set to 0.5; pre-negotiation delta price change, del_jump, 
is set to 0.15; continuation probability, p_sat, is set to 0.75; and weight of previous 
offers, w_mem, is set to 0.3.  
Client agents are distributed on the outer leaves of the topology in every experiment. 
Client agents simulate service demand requests. Client agents are configured to buy 
each service unit at a maximum price of 50 monetary units; its expected minimum 
value is set to 23 monetary units.  Values of the internal strategy parameters of each 
client agents are similar to other agents: concession probability, p_acq, is set to 0.75; 
in-negotiation delta price change, del_change, is set to 0.5; pre-negotiation delta price 
change, del_jump, is set to 0.15; continuation probability, p_sat, is set to 0.75; and 
weight of previous offers, w_mem, is set to 0.3.  
The discovery mechanism simulated is a flooding distributed search mechanism such 
as those implemented in Peer-to-Peer networks as Gnutella [9]. Clients send requests 
for services with a hop limiting counter; requests for services are forwarded among 
agents that decrease such a counter, until it reaches a null value. The hop counter is 
configured with a maximum value of 5. This discovery mechanism is simple to im-
plement but may generate a large number of messages in topologies with high degree 
nodes as in many realistic networks. 
Each negotiation is implemented as a contract-net protocol [42]. Buying agents, either 
clients or service-copies, negotiate with the first selling agent that is discovered, since 
it should provide a good service or resource quality because of its network proximity. 
If such negotiation fails they continue negotiating with the second selling agent dis-
covered. Negotiations only start after a demand request for a service arrives, we do 
not consider negotiations to pre-allocate resources before clients demands. We do not 
simulate bundle transactions where buyers buy resources transactionally from several 
providers, but such a possibility can be accommodated easily within the framework. 
4.3 Baseline system for comparison 
In the simulations, we wish to compare Catallaxy with a centralized baseline system 
which should behave near to the optimal in some scenarios because it aims at obtain-
ing total knowledge of the system. Therefore the entities configuring the baseline sys-
tem and its interactions are those shown in Figure 3. A centralized instance called the 
Master-service-copy (MSC), receives all requests and is informed by all resources and 
service copies of its availability. The MSC decides which resource and service-copy 
provide the service to each client request, and sends back an accept message to the 
client. The resource allocates the required resource units and the service-copy pro-
vides the service to the Client. The MSC is located in the central node of the topology. 
So as to compare both systems with economic parameters, the MSC implements an 
economic-based centralized allocation model based on economic double auctions 
[27][28]. The centralized auctioneer computes an equilibrium price every 50 msec. 
with requests and bids arriving from every party. Those client requests which have 
offered a price above the equilibrium prices are accepted, others are rejected.  
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Figure 3. Baseline system: A master service copy (MSC) receives request and offers, 
allocates and informs clients, resources and service copies of its decision.  
 
4.4 Grid scenarios for evaluation  
Our goal is to evaluate the Catallactic decentralized allocation approach. We expect 
Catallaxy to maintain good performance at low density P2P Grids and at highly dy-
namic Grids, in contrast to centralized approaches that cannot scale and adapt to 
changes. Thus by simulation we aim to explore the design space of Grid along two 
dimensions : Grid density and Grid dynamics. 
Grid density measures the concentration of Grid resources. The highest density is rea-
ched if only one service/resource providing node in the whole grid exists (with all ca-
pacity concentrated in it, i.e. a high performance computing center). The lowest den-
sity has every grid node providing the described service to others with small capacity 
(i.e. P2P Grid systems). Current Grids correspond to intermediate values of density.  
We will simulate Grids with different densities. A high density Grid formed by sev-
eral high performance clusters situated at highly connected core nodes in the physical 
topology similar to real computational centers (HPC Grid). A low density Grid will 
contained a higher number of small capacity nodes placed at edge nodes of the net-
work topology. (P2P Grid). To compare results among diffent scenarios the total Grid 
capacity will be the same in all experiments: 300 resource units, i.e., the total Grid 
capacity is 300 Gflops and 300 Mbits. To decrease node density between different 
scenarios, the number of nodes must be increased so that the total Grid capacity is the 
same in all simulation scenarios. Resource units are distributed uniformly among no-
des, but at lower density scenarios resource nodes are place in locations nearer to the 
edge of the network: in the high density experiments each node can provide 60 service 
units each, and there are 5 service-copy and 5 resource agents. In medium-high den-
sity each node can provide 30 service/resource units each, and there are 10 service-
copies and 10 resources. In medium-low density each node can provide 12 ser-
vice/resource units each, and there are 25 service-copies and 25 resources, and in the 
low density scenario, each node can provide 4 service units each, and there are 75 ser-
vice-copies and 75 resources nodes. 
Node dynamics measure the continuous availability of service/resource-providing 
nodes in the grid. Low dynamics mean an unchanging and constant availability (ASP 
or HPC centers); high dynamics are attributed to a grid where nodes start up and shut 
down with high frequency (case of end-user dial-up PCs). The values of node dynam-
ics are varied in the different simulations. During the experiments, the availability of 
each resource changes every 200ms with a certain probability, where this probability 
starts at 0% in the static case, and increases in steps of 10% up to 30% for the highly 
dynamic case.  Node dynamics simulate the availability of service/resource-providing 
nodes in the grid.  Availability of resources represents resource nodes which become 
unavailable due to network disconnections because they use a dial-up connection or a 
wireless connection. Low dynamics mean an unchanging and constant availability 
resource nodeas in the case of computational and data center; high dynamics are at-
tributed to a grid where nodes start up and shut down with high frequency as in the  
case of end user dial-up or wireless computers. 
4.5 Demand Workload 
Demand traces are generated by a random demand trace generator. The demand trace 
generator is configured to produce traces whose requests are generated with an aver-
age inter-request time of 25, 50, 100 or 200 milliseconds, i.e. a demand load of 40, 20, 
10 and 5 requests per second respectively. Demand requests are randomly assigned 
among 75 client nodes. Each generated client request will request one service unit. 
One service unit requires 1 Gflops computational power and 1 Mbits bandwidth ca-
pacity.  The service ID of each request corresponds to service IDs of existing service 
copies. Finally each request has an average duration of 5 seconds i.e. service copies 
and corresponding resources are allocated for 5 seconds. 
 
 
5. Performance evaluation   
 
 
5.1 Measurement criteria 
 
In this study, we apply both technical and economic parameters for the evaluation. 
Technical parameter are usually interesting only to some entities of the system, i.e. 
communication cost is important for network operators, whereas economic parameters 
can measure how well all participants of the system fulfil their interest. The technical 
parameters we evaluate are resource allocation efficiency (RAE), response time  
(REST), and communication cost (CC). The economical parameter we evaluate is so-
cial welfare (SWF).  
 
Resource Allocation Efficiency (RAE) 
Resource Allocation Efficiency (RAE) is our main technical criterion. It indicates the 
ratio of service demands, for which the Grid provides a service, to all sent service de-
mands. In other words, it measures how many requests are allocated a service copy 
which has been allocated resources. A higher RAE is deemed to be better both for the 
client agent and for the Grid as a whole. However, this parameter does not capture the 
cost nor the effects derived from the service provision. 
 
Response Time (REST) 
The Response Time (REST) measures the time from when a request is produced in a 
client until the request service instance has been granted. It does not depend on the 
type of service, since service time is included. It is only influenced by the necessary 
mechanisms to establish a service session between client and service, and by the phy-
sical network response time. For comparing different coordination mechanisms, a 
lower average REST is considered to be better. 
 
Bandwidth utilization/Communication Cost (CC) 
This parameter measures the cost of the control messages sent in the network to pro-
vide a service. In our simulator, we use different message types to fulfil the negotia-
tion protocol. To assess the bandwidth utilization, however, we treat the message size 
as a constant which is the same for all control message types, and use a global hop 
counter, which computes the total number of hops needed for control messages to 
complete the service provision for a certain demand trace. 
 
Social Welfare (SWF) 
Social welfare utility (SWF) measures how well all participants of an economic sys-
tem can maximize their individual utility. Basically, utility measures the fulfillment of 
self- interest of the participants. The equation for SWF in its easiest form sums up the 
individual utility profits ui: 
                                                        å= iSWF uU                 (1) 
Individuals are everyone who participate in the economic environment. For a Grid, 
the individual players are the clients (Clients which demand and pay for service ac-
cess), the service provider instances (ServiceCopies which offer access and receive 
payments) and finally the resources providers (Resources which offer bandwidth and 
storage to the service instances). Thus, the equation can be written as: 
                                ååå ++= RkSCjCiSWF uuuU      (2) 
The self- interest of the clients is to access a service at the lowest cost and/or the fast-
est time. Utility can thus be measured either using costs or time. In this work we 
consider that services must be paid for access, and services are allocated enough re-
sources to be accessed in a set time (if service are not accessed in  that time the Ser-
vice Level Agreement must be considered as unfulfilled). The utility gain of clients is 
the difference between their private value of what the access is worth (p), and the ac-
tually paid transaction price (vi,p): 
       pvu pi
C
i -= ,      (3) 
The self- interest of the service provider is always  to provide access to some service 
instance. Each client request for a service requires one service copy to buy resources 
at the lowest cost from resource providers. Like the clients, the service providers also 
have a private value for service access (psa) . In addition, there is private value for bu-
ying resource access from the hosting node (pra), therefore the utility of the service 
provider is the utility gain in the service market plus the utility gain in the resource 
market: 
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The self- interest of the resources providers is to make profits by increasing the usage 
of the resources. The utility gain of resources is the difference between the actually 
sold resource price (vp,k) and their private value of what the resource costs (p): 
       kp
R
k vpu ,-=      (5) 
The “maximum social welfare-criterion” (SWF) balances both costs and revenue in-
curred by the nodes and allows comparison of different variants of the Catallaxy and 
Baseline implementations. It should be pointed out that SWF solutions are a subset of 
“Pareto-efficient” ones; once the sum of the payoffs is maximized, an agent's payoff 
can increase only if another agent's payoff decreases. 
5.2 Results 
Each experiment runs for 2000 seconds simulated time. After 10 repetitions of the ex-
periments, the uncertainty of measuring any parameter was found to be sufficiently 
small (stddev < 2 %).  
 
Performance in highly loaded Grids  
The behaviour of a system when demand load increases is saturation; no more re-
quests can be allocated. Further load will produce congestion; fewer requests are allo-
cated than at saturation point.  
Figure 4 shows the behaviour of a catallactic-operated grid when demand load in-
creases from 5 requests per second to 10, 20 and 40. The grid density and dynamics of 
those simulations are the high density, low dynamics scenario corresponding to high-
capacity continuous available nodes (HPC Grid). 
Resource allocation efficiency RAE drops to 60% of successful allocations due to re-
source saturation. For the catallactic-operating mode the response time REST in-
creases very fast at high loads since the flooding discovery mechanisms take longer to 
find a node with available resources. For the baseline system it the response time is 
similar at different loads, since the computational time to match demand and offer is 
not simulated. The response time is the average time to transmit a request to the cen-
tral allocator, plus a constant value to compute such allocation, plus the time to send 
back the decision. For both mechanisms the communication cost CCis lower at high 
demand loads because we only measure the communication cost of successful alloca-
tions. Finally, the social welfare utility SWF is lower at high demand loads because 
competition among clients decreases clients’ utility, since they are forced to buy re-
sources at a higher cost. When demand load is very high, service copies and resources 
increase their prices to such an extent that many clients cannot buy, therefore overall 
utility drops. 
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Figure 4. Catallactic (triangles) and baseline (crosses) behavior with demand loads of 
5 requests units per second to 10, 20 and 40. 
Performance in high and low density Grids  
The expected behaviour as density decreases is that it becomes more difficult to allo-
cate requests because resources and service copies are more dispersed; for the same 
total number of resource units there are more resource and service copy nodes.  
Figure 5 shows the behaviour of catallactic and baseline operated grids when density 
decreases from high capacity nodes to low capacity nodes. Total grid capacity is 
maintained by increasing the number of nodes. The total demand load corresponds to 
a medium-highly loaded demand with 20 requests per second. Node dynamics is set to 
zero; nodes are always available.  
Resource allocation efficiency drops for both catallactic and baseline operated grids. 
However, the baseline system shows worse behavior because it must monitor an in-
creasing number of nodes that leads to a situation where more requests are 
unmatched. On the other hand, the decentralized catallactic system can cope better 
with higher number of nodes. The overall utility is higher for the catallactic system 
than for the baseline system. However, it also decreases as node number increases due 
to higher competition among service-copy and resource nodes.  As expected, the total 
communication cost increases for both mechanisms. The response time increases for 
the baseline system as density decreases, since it becomes busier monitoring an in-
creasing number of nodes. The response time for the catallactic system is higher than 
the baseline system in all density and it is dependent on the placement of nodes. In 
high density Grids the response time is influenced most by the discovery time, it takes 
less time to discover a free resource as nodes are more dispersed in the network, i.e. as 
density is lower.  However in very low density Grids the response time presents a 
high overhead due to longer negotiation times with nodes that are place in the edge of 
the network, therefore it increases compared to intermediate values of density. 
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Figure 5. Catallactic (triangles) and baseline (crosses) behavior in Grids with differ-
ent density. The HPC Grid, relative density of 1, has little number of high capacity 
nodes (5 resources nodes with 60 resources units each) and P2P Grids have increasing 
number of nodes and decreasing node capacity relative to the HPC Grid (10, 25 and 
75 nodes with 30, 12 and 4 resource units each respectively). Total Grid capacity has 
been maintained for all scenarios. Besides placement of resources nodes changes from 
central location in the network at the HPC Grid to edge locations of the network in the 
scenario with low density, P2P Grid. 
Performance in highly available and disconnecting Grids 
The two main consequences of node disconnections are: first in the catallactic mode 
negotiations are aborted and in the baseline system there are allocations at discon-
nected nodes; and second, service sessions are interrupted. Since we do not simulate 
service sessions this second effect is not taken into account. 
Figure 6 shows the behaviour of catallactic and baseline operated grids when node 
dynamics increase from always connected nodes to nodes highly disconnected with 
probabilities increasing up to 30 % of time. The total demand load corresponds to a 
medium-highly loaded demand with 20 requests per second. Node density is set to the 
high capacity nodes.  
The main effect of node dynamics increase is a decrease of resource allocation effi-
ciency, since an increasing number of negotiations in the catallactic case are aborted, 
whereas in the baseline case there are an increasing number of allocations to discon-
nected nodes. The response time for the catallactic system is influenced by node dy-
namics, because after an agent has aborted a negotiation it can restart another negotia-
tion with other agent, thus extending the response time. Nevertheless, in the baseline 
system, if an agent is allocated a service copy or resource node that becomes discon-
nected, it does not issue a new allocation request. Therefore the allocation efficiency 
is lower than for the catallactic system. The social welfare is lower for the catallactic 
system because nodes tend to decrease their negotiation prices to achieve a successful 
negotiation. Nodes do not know why a negotiation has failed. A node discontinuing to 
negotiate and a node being disconnected produce the same effect.  
Finally, we do not simulate the baseline master node being disconnected, which 
would yield far worse results for the baseline system, as for any centralized system 
subject to failures.  
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Figure 6. Catallactic (triangles) and baseline (crosses) behavior in a highly available 
Grid, 0 % probability of being disconnected, and in disconnecting Grids with 10, 20 
and 30 probability of node being disconnected. 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions and outlook 
In this work we show how to apply the Catallaxy decentralized economic-based allo-
cation model to Grids. The Catallaxy paradigm applied to Grids is implemented by 
three types of agents that represent clients, service providers and resource providers. 
These agents try to maximize their utility according to their internal strategy negotiat-
ing with each other in two different but interrelated Grid resource and service mar-
kets. We simulate such Grid markets and catallactic agents in order to evaluate their 
behavior with different demand loads in a number of Grid density and dynamic envi-
ronments. We compare these results with a baseline system implementing a central-
ized double auction allocation mechanism.  
The behavior of the catallactic allocation mechanism when the demand load increase 
is similar to the baseline system; there is a decrease of allocation efficiency due to re-
source saturation. The response time increases considerably, since it takes longer to 
discover free resources. However, in the baseline system the central allocator will suf-
fer from demand requests overload, which can cause problems, whereas in a Catallac-
tic system such demand load is distributed throughout the Grid. In low Grid density 
scenarios the performance of the catallactic and the baseline allocation mechanism 
degrades due to the dispersion of nodes, nevertheless the catallatic system shows hig-
her resource allocation efficiency and overall utility than the baseline system. The 
central allocator of the baseline system must monitor more nodes and the complexity 
of the allocation grows. Whereas the catallactic system copes better with higher num-
ber of nodes, however utility decreases due to higher competition.   The response time 
for the catallactic system shows a peculiar influence on the placement of resources, 
intermediate Grid densities scenarios show the lower response times. Finally, when 
node dynamics are evaluated by simulating node disconnections from the network, the 
Catallaxy approach also shows good behavior since autonomous nodes respond better 
to failures than centralized allocators. In every scenario the response time of the catal-
lactic system has been worst than in the baseline system, though in the baseline sys-
tem the computational time to match demand and offer was not simulated.  
In summary, the Catallactic system shows similar efficiency to a centralized system 
but provides advantages due to its decentralized operation: scalability to demand and 
offer, and fault tolerance in dynamic environments. However response time is high 
due to discovery mechanisms and negotiation time. Efficient discovery mechanism 
such as distributed hash tables DHT [40] will decrease response time. Catallaxy will 
benefit most to long running services where allocation response time can be ne-
glected, in favor of higher allocation efficiency and overall utility.  
Future work required falls into two areas: incorporating machine learning mechanisms 
into agents to make their strategy adaptable, and incorporating reputation mechanisms 
for scenarios where nodes can decide not to fulfill their contracts. There are different 
machine learning mechanisms to enable  agents to learn how to improve their strategy. 
One kind of machine learning algorithm that is completely decentralized, and thus sui-
table for Catallaxy, are evolutionary algorithms where genotypes suffer mutations and 
recombination. These algorithms have been applied to Catallaxy in other scena rios 
[43].  A preliminary solution to the problem of negotia ting agents not fulfilling their 
contracts has been proposed in [44], however a more decentralized solution is cur-
rently being investigated.  
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